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Abstract
The Hungarian inferential-evidential expression szerint ‘according to somebody/some-
thing’ is highly multifaceted. It can be furnished with person and number suffixes. It can 
occur in all major sentence types but with different person features and/or collocations. 
It can be associated with a quotative meaning and can express some kind of judgment in 
declarative sentences and questions, too. Imperative sentences can serve as a source of its 
further uses: it can be interpreted both as advice and as an expression of the speaker’s firm 
stance typically based on moral concerns. We intend to account for this extremely complex 
distribution with respect to person, attitude, sentence type and collocation in a highly sys-
tematic and explanatorily adequate manner in the “cognitively viable” representationalist 
dynamic discourse- and mind-representation theory ReALIS. We attempt to carry out this 
task in a way that sheds new light on how such expressions make language a basic means 
of achieving epistemic control and intersubjective alignment.
Keywords
inferentiality, evidentiality, uncertainty, quotation, advice, instruction, dynamic pragmase-
mantics, information state1. Introduction
This paper investigates the pragmasemantic role of the epistemic-evidential 
postpositional expression szerint in Hungarian grammar (Kugler 2012; Dér 
2016). The expression is highly similar to epistemic discourse markers such as 
1 G. Alberti is sponsored by NKFIH 120073 (Comprehensive Grammar Resources – Hun-
garian: Open Access). 
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valószínűleg ‘probably’, talán ‘perhaps’, esetleg ‘could possibly’: the propositions 
modified by them should be interpreted as hypotheses.
(1) a. Ili (én)szerintem hazaköltözött.
 Ili (I)-evid-1sg home.move-past2
 ‘In my opinion, Ili moved back home.’
 b. Ili valószínűleg/ talán/ esetleg hazaköltözött.
 Ili probably perhaps possibly home.move-past
 ‘Ili probably/perhaps/possibly moved back home.’
The difference lies exactly with the pronominal component present in (én)- 
szerintem. This makes the degree of (un)certainty less precise than in the case 
of the discourse markers given in (1b),3 but shows the person who should be 
regarded as (i) having some evidence e in support of the proposition p, and (ii) 
having a general, typically underspecified everyday inferential rule which can 
be specified in the given context as follows: e → p.4
It is a further specialty of the paradigm of szerint-expressions that this in-
ferential-evidential discourse marker (Willett 1988: 57), in contrast to other 
discourse markers (2a), can perform the same information-structural func-
tions as subcategorized arguments in Hungarian (É. Kiss 2002); for instance, 
the function of an also-quantifier or an only-focus (2b). This property can ob-
viously be traced back to the pronominal basis of szerint-expressions.
(2) a. *Ili [esetleg is hazaköltözött]/ [csak esetleg költözött haza].
  Ili could.possibly also home.move-past only could.possibly move-past home
 b. Ili [(én)szerintem is hazaköltözött]/ [csak (te)szerinted költözött haza].
  Ili (I)-evid-1sg also home.move-past only (you)-evid-2sg move-past home
  ‘[In my opinion, too,] / [It is only in your opinion that] Ili moved back home.’
Furthermore, based on the referent who should be regarded as holding the 
information, szerint can express quotative “hearsay” evidence (3a) as well as 
judgment (3b) and advice/moral stance (3c).
(3) a. Ili Péter/az újság szerint hazaköltözött.
 Ili Péter/the newspaper evid home.move-past
 ‘Péter/the newspaper says that Ili moved back home.’
2 Abbreviations are as follows. A – authority; B – belief; D – desire /  interest; E – experi-
ence; EVID – evidential; i – I (first person); I – intention; INS – instrumental case; o – other 
(third) person; PL – plural; ReALIS – REciprocal and Lifelong Interpretation System (Alberti 
and Kleiber 2014); SBJV: subjunctive mode; SG – singular; u – you (second person).
3 In order to make the degree of certainty more precise, the probability markers in (1b) can 
be combined with the szerint-expression. 
4 Szerint-expressions express probability indirectly. The inferential rule e → p  is meant as 
follows: it is not sure, only more or less probable, that p comes with the evidence e.
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 b. Ili (én)szerintem szép.
 Ili (I)-evid-1sg pretty.
 ‘I judge Ili to be pretty.’
 c. (Én)szerintem házasodjatok össze!
 (I)-evid-1sg marry-sbjv-2pl together
 Meaning 1: ‘I advise you to get married.’
 [… ‘Getting married can mean that you  get  to  take advantage of less tax 
on your savings interest.’]
 Meaning 2: ‘You must get married, that is my firm moral stance.’
Example (3b) shows that a szerint-expression, in addition to the probabilistic/
evidential–inferential meaning (1a) and the quotative one (3a), can also ex-
press some kind of judgment (3b). In this case the expression cannot indicate 
outer world evidence and it necessarily encodes a  subjective opinion of the 
speaker, practically their decision on some evaluation. Imperative sentences 
can serve as a source of further uses of szerint-expressions; (3c) can be inter-
preted both as advice (Meaning 1) and as an expression of the speaker’s firm 
moral stance (Meaning 2).5
We intend to account for all these phenomena and a  few further proper-
ties of szerint-expressions – including their acceptability in different sentence 
types, illustrated in (4)  – in the representationalist dynamic discourse- and 
mind-representation theory ReALIS. Due to the formal theoretical framework, 
we can capture and represent the source of evidence and epistemic possibility 
compositionally.
(4) a. Ili szerint-em/?? -ed /-e [ott volt] szép.
 Ili evid-1sg -2sg -3sg there be-past pretty
 ‘I/youSG/he consider(s) Ili [to have been there] pretty.’
 b. Ili ??szerint-em/ -ed /-e [ott volt] szép?
 Ili evid-1sg -2sg -3sg there be-past pretty?
 ‘Do(es) I/youSG/he consider Ili [to have been there] pretty?’
 c. Szerint-em/?? -ed/ -e házasodjanak össze!
 evid-1sg -2sg -3sg marry-sbjv-3pl together
 Meaning 1: ‘I/YouSG/He advise(s) them to get married.’
 Meaning 2: ‘You must get married, that is my/your/his firm stance.’
5 In order to present not only self-constructed sentences, (i) and (ii) are naturally occurring 
examples from the Hungarian National Corpus (Oravecz et al. 2014); special thanks to Nóra 
Kugler). Notice that (i) is used to give advice and (ii) expresses moral concerns:
(i) Anyácska szerint a ruha az idomokat csábosan sejtesse. (#19055477) 
 ‘Mama says a dress should temptingly imply the curves of the body.’
(ii) Ancika néni szerint ne kelljen nekem minden, ami a másé, mert az már túlzás. (#191322) 
  ‘Aunt Ancika thinks/says that I  should’t desire everything that belongs to others, be 
cause that pretty much crosses all lines.’ 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. After sketching the relevant elements 
of the ReALIS toolbox in section 2, section 3 presents the formal description of 
the intensional profiles of the three major sentence types, which, as shown in 
(4), are potential hosts of different types of szerint-expression; their intensional 
profiles are discussed in Section 4. The paper concludes with a short summa-
ry and the take-home message that event and experiencing state as temporally 
concurrent, in spite of its Montagovian foundation (Dowty et al. 1981), aims at 
serving as a “cognitively viable linguistic representation” (Andor 2011: 1, 8–9), 
whose distinguished importance comes from the crucial role of the expression 
of evidentiality in making language “a basic means of achieving epistemic con-
trol and intersubjective alignment” (Langacker 2017:15).
2.  ℜeALIS toolbox in the description of sentence types and discourse markers
In Montagovian formal semantics (Dowty et al. 1981), sentence-sized prop-
ositional contents should be constructed so that the resulting formulas can 
undergo truth evaluation in arbitrary possible worlds. From the viewpoint of 
ReALIS, the basic task of pragmatics can be reformulated as the designation of 
certain possible worlds on the basis of the linguistic form created by the speak-
er. ReALIS thus captures intensionality with possible-world labels (see Tables 
1, 3, 4 in Section 3–4) instead of higher-order logical formulas, criticized by 
Searle (cf. Andor 2011: 8–9).
The ReALIS framework is to be regarded as the representationalist counter-
part (Kamp et al. 2011) of Lauer’s (2013) antirepresentationalist dynamic prag-
matics, provided that the first steps of both models are aimed at deciding what 
truth values the declarative, interrogative and imperative conventions “expect” 
in the addresser’s and the adressee’s definite possible worlds. A formal dynamic 
pragmatics, in our conceptualization, can capture the linguistic phenomena tra-
ditionally described in such concepts as illocutionary act/effect and perlocution-
ary effect (e.g. Searle 1979) via designating the relevant subset of the basis of in-
terpretation. In the possible world of the addresser’s beliefs, for instance, the ideal 
truth values according to the three conventions are +1, 0, and –1, respectively. In 
a declaration, the conveyed proposition e is thought to be true. In a question, the 
truth of e  is unknown. The one who performs an imperative sentence should 
think that e (still) does not hold. It can also be truth-evaluated in a similar man-
ner whether the addresser assumes the addressee to consider e true, to long for 
its realization, or to be able to carry it out. This recursion can then be followed it-
eratively in order to consider possible worlds such as those which can be charac-
terized by questions like this: what are the addresser’s beliefs, desires and inten-
tions concerning the addressee’s beliefs, desires and intentions concerning them, 
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i.e. the addressers themselves. ReALIS intends to explore not only the possible 
worlds evoked by the major sentence types but also those evoked by discourse 
markers. The description of intensional profiles of sentence types and dis- 
course markers serves the purpose of revealing how to read each others’ minds.
To represent the (finite) information which is at the interlocutors’ disposal 
in any discursive situation, we use a finite structure we call worldlet. A wordlet 
is essentially a Kampian discourse representation unit but one of mental na-
ture; it is assumed to be stored in the interlocutors’ mind as part of their current 
information state. In the course of the description of both the conventional-
ized intensional profiles of the sentence types or the discourse markers and the 
interlocutors’ underlying mental states, it is essential to account for the propo-
sitions in question as true, undecided, or false – in accordance with the collec-
tions of pieces of information that the certain worldlets consist of. Instead of 
the usual triplet of 〈+1,0,–1〉, however, we go as far as proposing an 11-degree 
scale of fifths in order to capture “certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal 
space in between” (see Cantarini et al. 2014). Falseness, then, will correspond 
to –5/5, while –3/5 refers to the evaluation “quite probably not hold,” for in-
stance. Instead of such fractions, however, we are going to use the set 〈–5,–4, 
–3,–2,–1,0,+1,+2,+3,+4,+5〉 of whole numbers. Truth and falseness will thus be 
expressed by the whole numbers –5 and +5, respectively.
It is a  hot topic in modern discourse-representation theories that a  dis-
course referent is typically “in the crossfire” of several mental attitudes (Maier 
2016: 477), which also holds for eventual referents (which refer to states of af-
fairs, events, actions). That Katy kissed Alex, for instance, can be a sensorial 
experience for an accidental witness (E: experience), as well as a belief for her 
sister (B: belief, “it is likely that there was a kiss...”), which the sister, say, is glad 
about (D: desire). It might also be that kissing Alex appeared among Katy’s 
plans at a certain moment (I: intention). Attitudes can also be embedded in 
each other recursively. Katy’s plan, for instance, can be conjectured by her sis-
ter, placing the given eventual referent in a B–I type worldlet. Suppose further 
that their brother knows nothing about Katy’s sister’s conjecture: this way we 
have reached a B–B–I type worldlet.
The thesis of ReALIS is that conglomerates of such worldlets of complex 
indices are mobilized in interlocutors by discourse markers, after having set 
certain worldlet combinations as basic values via selecting the sentence type. 
In everyday communication these worldlets are more or less mutated partial 
mirror images of each other. From our Montagovian formal semantic depar-
ture, thus, we can arrive at the same questions as mind theorists, who conduct 
research into how and to what extent we attempt to see into each others’ minds, 
that is, how we can mentalize each other (Wimmer and Perner 1983).
It is commonplace that language is a means for human beings to express their 
beliefs, desires, intentions, and to talk about several further objects of worlds 
hidden in their minds in numerous ways. What ReALIS aims at demonstrating 
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in all related publications resting upon this approach is that, within this huge 
world structure, the substructures evoked by given linguistic items can be much 
more precisely and formally identified than many would think. What obscures 
this alleged concreteness for the researchers, then? The interlocutors’ freedom to 
not only use but also misuse the worldlet-mobilizing potential of sentences, or at 
least, the ability of using this potential “creatively” or indirectly.
The system of worldlets that our approach is based upon relies on a struc-
tured set of labels. Attitudes such as belief (B), desire (D), and intention (I) 
are central components of the last decade’s ReALIS-descriptions. This BDI-
language has recently been completed with an attitude referred to as authority 
(A). As our beliefs, desires and other attitudes are in permanent change, a dy-
namic pragmasemantic theory should capture this temporal feature. It should 
also capture the property of communication that a person (say, in the dimen-
sion of B-attitude) considers different things to be true than another person 
does. In addition to the attitudinal component, thus, a worldlet label should 
also contain a temporal “stamp”, as well as some reference to the host of the 
given worldlet.
As an illustration, let us consider the following three triplets: iD0, uB+, oA. 
The first character in the sequences refers to the addresser (‘I’), the addressee 
(‘you’), and to someone who does not take part in the conversation under con-
sideration (‘other’) respectively. The third character marks the point of time 
relative to the utterance time 0 as follows: ‘+’ refers to a later point and ‘–’ to 
a previous one. Thus, iD0 indicates the worldlet of “my present desires”, uB+ 
that of “your later beliefs”, and oA is the simplified indication of a third per-
son’s authority. These labels can be built on each other in unbounded recur-
sion. The worldlet with the label iBuBiB, for instance, is a distinguished one 
for mentalization: it is a collection of the addresser’s beliefs concerning the ad-
dressee’s beliefs about the addresser (“I believe that you believe that I belive...”). 
In other words, what is considered here is how “I assume to be viewed by you.”
3. Intensional profiles of major sentence types
This section presents the intensional profiles of the major sentence types: de-
claratives, interrogatives and imperatives.
3.1.  What do we know, what do we long for, what do we have 
authority over, and on the basis of all this, what do we 
want from the listener?
Our formally-defined intensional profiles are designed to capture how a pro- 
position e conveyed by a sentence is enveloped in possible worlds – or more 
precisely, in partial ones called worldlets – responsible for its illocutionary 
213Pragmasemantic Analysis of the Hungarian Inferential…
force. Truth evaluation in worldlets labeled iB, iD and iA, on the one hand, 
and iBuB, iBuD and iBuA, on the other, reveals what the ideal addresser, 
while performing a sentence with content e, believes, longs for, has author-
ity over, and assumes the addressee to believe, long for, and have authority 
over. All this is then completed with the worldlet of intentions. In particular, 
the worldlet with label iIuI+ plays a crucial role: “[I intend you to intend e’]” 
where e’ is a propositional content to be judged on the basis of e, the content 
immediately conveyed by the given sentence.
The general conception sketched in the previous paragraph is presented 
in a formalized way in Table 1 as an underspecified intensional profile with 
the name ‘target-oriented mentalization’. We attribute significance to such 
a fictive profile, which serves as the shared basis for the intensional profiles 
which define the three major sentence types, primarily in the process of con-
structing our comprehensive mental system of conventionalized intensional 
profiles. In the course of language acquisition infants obtain meagre data, at 
least compared to the high complexity of the system. Hence, we rest on the 
idea that the acquisition of the system requires that they often have recourse 
to general methods of creating lacking truth values in profiles such as com-
positionality (in the Fregean/Montagovian sense), opposition, and transfer-
ring values.
The profile of target-oriented mentalization describes a conscious being 
concentrating on a  state-of-affairs e, whose [–5,+5] scale in the iB-dimen-
sion is exactly distributed into three disjoint intervals by the three major 
sentence types. Value –5 provides profile for the speaker who, aware of the 
fact that e does not hold, intends to change that state of things, by calling 
the listener for help, using an imperative sentence. The situation in which 
iB∈+5 may stimulate readiness for cooperation: as information is valuable, 
supplying the listener with e which the speaker knows to be true, is likely to 
serve the listener’s interest. The situation in which iB∈[–4,+4]=“0” can be 
construed as follows: the speaker is not in a position to carry out the former 
two types of action, so their obvious aim can be to reach one of these states 
(iB+∈+5 or iB+∈–5); this can be initiated by taking the addresser role of 
a yes-or-no question.6
6 ‘n’ and “n” denote a narrow and a broader interval around n in the following precise sense: 
the former symbol means a (bell-shaped) normal distribution over interval [n–2, n+2] while the 
latter one a flatter normal distribution over interval [n–4, n+4]. Symbols ‘n, “n, n’ and n” denote 
the left/right half of the corresponding normal distributions. Θ marks the special set {–5, +5}, 
and rese refers to the result state of the event structure of e.
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Table 1. The three basic conventionalized intensional profiles and their shared basis
The second step in the profile of target-oriented mentalization concerns the 
addressee. The question is what kind of knowledge (concerning e) renders the 
listener suitable for the addressee role. As we are now attempting to reveal 
the background of major sentence types which are not modified by discourse 
markers, the knowledge that belongs to the addressee role can be either the 
same as, or the opposite of, the knowledge of the addresser. More special re-
lations should be marked (by discourse markers). The imperative will specify 
the background in the former way (“the same as”): it is on this - shared nega-
tive (iB=iBuB=–5) - basis that the speaker can call for a joining of forces in or-
der to change the (unwanted) state of things. As for the latter way, what makes 
sense of uttering a declarative type is exactly the uninformedness of the lis-
tener: iBuB≠+5, with a speaker informed.7 A similar opposition makes sense 
of the interrogative type, except that now the listener is assumed to have the 
information: iBuB∈±5, with the speaker uninformed in respect of the truth 
value of e. Note that the informed status of u can mean both knowing that e is 
true, and that it is false. The iB component in label iBuB is responsible for men-
talization (“What I think about you is that...”). The model we present in the ta-
ble is that its value is “+5 (i.e., the left half of a bell-shaped distribution), in the 
case of worldlets iBuD and iBuA, too. That is, the speaker’s ideal position is to 
have sure knowledge about the listener’s given attitude (+5). The worst (still 
acceptable) case can be formulated as follows: it arises in the speaker’s mind as 
a possibility (iBuX=+1) that the given attitude, X is what is prescribed in the 
given intensional profile as the value of iBuX. This approach to mentalization 
7 The given value pertains to the underlined part of the complex label in question (but un-
derlining can be omitted if the given n-tuple of values pertains to the last n worldlet compo-
nents). If a pair or triplet belongs to a complex part of a  label, the corresponding values are 
connected by the symbol ‘•’.
Target-oriented 
mentalization
Declarative 
basic
Imperative 
basic
Interrogative 
Basic
For e: iB iB=α∈+5 iB=γ∈−5 iBiB=γ•Θ=−5•5→iB∈’’0’’
iBuB∈’’+5 iBuB∈α*=’’’0’’ iBuB=γ∈−5 iBuBiB=Θ=5→iBuBiB∈’’+5•(’)+5•’’0’’
For e’: ...•W,
r∈R⊆{i,u,o} W=uB+
(W=0B+)
Default: e’=rese
W=iB+
(ΣiB∙rD)/ |5R| ∈’’+5 iBrDuB+∈Θ=5 For e’: iBrD iBrDiB+∈Θ=5
iBuA∈’’+5•’’+5 iBuAuB+=β∈Θ For e’: iBuA
iBuAiB+∈Θ
Crucial: iBuB=β∈Θ
For e’’: iIuI+∈’’+5•+5 iIuI+uB+=α For e: iIuI+ iIuI+iB+=β
iAiIuI+∈’’+5
iAiIuI+uB+=α
For e: iAiIuI+ iAiIuI+iB+=β
Preferable: iE=α
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is very permissive and uniform; it expresses our experiences gained so far in 
the course of our research activity, lending no support to the idea that the 
speaker should monitor the attitudinal dimensions uB, uD and uA differently.
The speaker thus concentrates his or her attention to an eventuality e and 
assesses what he or she and his or her listeners know about the truth value of 
e (szerint-expressions will increase this epistemic control over the given con-
tent. The next question, then, is what desire moves the speaker to the given 
speech act. It can generally be claimed that this desire pertains to an eventual-
ity e’ which has to be construed on the basis of e. Hence, in worldlets iD and 
iBuD, it is e’ that is there to be evaluated. As for authority, the listener has entire 
authority (+5) over e’ in an ideal case while in the worst case (+1) they might 
be able to execute e’ (iBuA∈”+5). In the case of an imperative, e’ essentially co-
incides with e; only the truth value of e should be reversed. As declaration and 
interrogation aim at transmitting some knowledge on e, e’ should be defined 
on the basis of output information states uB+ and iB+. If, for instance, e is the 
state that Ili has moved back home (cf. (1a)), then e’ is the event that [the cor-
responding interlocutor (I or you) learns that Ili has moved back home].
It has not yet been discussed which interlocutor’s interest is to be served 
in the different major sentence types. The hypothesis we will argue for is that 
in the “discourse-markerless” basic case the decision is not made yet, but the 
speaker enforces some kind of mutual interest by using the major intensional 
profiles. In Table 1 the formula with summation is devoted to the formulation 
of this approach; subsection 3.2 will provide explanation.
The general formulation of addresser’s intention should be related to a po-
tentially third eventuality e”, also to be calculated on the basis of e, whose 
achievement is assumed to require the addressee’s aid (iIuI+: [I intend you to 
intend e”]). In the imperative, the ultimate intention will pertain to the reset-
ting of the truth value of e in the external world, whilst declaratives and inter-
rogatives serve the purpose of resetting the generalized truth value of e in cer-
tain interlocutors’ output information states.
Another generalization formulates when a speaker can take the addresser 
role of an intensional profile. Speakers are in a position to take this role if their 
intention to influence the partner does not violate any criterion of authority 
(iAiIuI+∈+5), or at least they think they have some argument for why they 
have authority (iAiIuI+=+1).
To sum up, this subsection has attempted to capture what is common in the 
three major intensional profiles. There is a potential speaker concentrating on an 
eventuality e. He or she is speculating about e. What (s)he reaches will serve as 
a point of departure for something whose realization (s)he imagines to carry out 
with the aid of an addressee that (s)he selects and mentalizes. This process may halt 
at the level of a thought experiment, or get specified into the intensional profile of 
one of the major sentence types, resulting in the performance of a speech act.
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3.2. Imperative profile
As we strive for explanatory adequacy, we hypothesize that children – on the 
basis of the meagre data set available to them – possess the following system 
of intensional profiles. Only certain “generator values” should be set and kept 
in mind; they appear with a black background in Table 1. Other values in the 
profiles are decided by means of general constraints requiring certain values to 
equal or to stand in complementary distribution. The iBuB-values in the gen-
eral target-oriented mentalization, for instance, are assumed to coincide with 
the iB-value or to be its opposite (α* is defined as the set consisting of the scale 
values which are not in set α or {α}).
We attempt to base the current model of profile system on the assumption 
that the iB-value always serves as a generator, that is, “what I know about the 
truth status of the given eventuality” is a  definitive point of departure for 
the intensional profile in question. The iB-generator of the imperative is the 
value –5, as a truth value of the propositional content the given sentence con-
veys. The imperative in (5a), for instance, is senseless if Ili is (already) at home. 
The “negative knowledge” should be shared by both the addresser and the ad-
dressee: iB=–5=iBuB, as illustrated by the rejecting reaction of a potential lis-
tener presented in (5b).
(5) a. Ili, menj haza!
 Ili, go-sbjv home
 ‘Ili, go home!’
 b. ‘I am at home.’
Let us now turn to the dimension of desires and to the interests underlying 
them. Texts (6a-c) are all potential continuations at the speaker’s disposal. The 
variants illustrate that, in the background of using the given imperative sen-
tence (5a), there may stand the speaker’s desire (6a) as well as the listener’s one 
(6b), or perhaps that of an outsider (6c). Moreover, to carry out e may be a mu-
tual interest, at least in the speaker’s opinion (6d). Accounting appropriately 
for all these facts requires a flexible model.
(6) a. I am fed up with you. R={i}
 b. You had better go home. R={u}
 c.  Are you saying this because of my husband? He is watching a match right now 
with his friends, and he prefers if I don’t disturb him at home.’      R={o}
 d. (6a) + [I’m convinced that this way both of us will feel better.]
 R={i,u}; (iBiD⋅iBiD+iBuD⋅iBuD)/10=(5⋅5+3⋅4)/10=3,7
In an ideal model the desires considered should be averaged, or rather, sum-
marized as a first step. It is also worth considering that the speaker is likely to 
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be aware of others’ desires in different degrees; it is the technique of weight-
ing that the mathematical toolbox offers in such cases. The formula with sum-
mation in Table 1 can elegantly be called the epistemically weighted average of 
interests. There is a calculation associated with (6d) illustrating the formula. 
The subtotals emerge as follows. 5⋅5: the speaker is absolutely sure that they 
want the listener to leave; 3⋅4: the speaker finds that the listener probably has 
a strong desire to go home. Then the sum of subtotals should be divided by two, 
i.e. by the number of those taken into account, as the speaker and the listener 
have been considered, and then also by five, as the scale of values rests upon 
fifths. The set R of those whose desire is taken into account, provided by the 
addresser profile proposed in an underspecified manner, serves as a key ingre-
dient of the D-dimension in all the three specified variants of target-oriented 
mentalization, but will not be discussed in 3.3 and 3.4. One might think that 
it offers too much freedom, but we claim that it will get specified just like pro-
nouns such as this or everyone in real contexts. Speakers know whose interest 
they intend to serve, and listeners should also make a reliable decision on the 
given interests (6).
In the dimension of intentions (see Table 1), e itself plays the role e” in tar-
get-oriented mentalization ([I intend you to intend e”]), or, within its complex 
event structure, its preparatory phase does. In the case of (5a), for instance, 
the listener is instructed (to begin) to go home. As for authorities, the speaker 
must have authority over warranting the issue while the listener must be able 
to perform it. Both parts may be refused, as shown in (7a,b), in which the rel-
evant components of the resisting listener’s thoughts are presented in bold as 
reactions to the corresponding criteria concerning authorities.
(7) a. You are not in a position to give me commands. iAiIuI+ → uBiAiIuI+∈0
 b. I am not able to go home this drunk. iBuA → uBuA∈0 
3.3. Declarative profile
Being in the possession of a  piece of information (e; see (8a))—by this we 
mean the state iB∈+5—what can the speaker want to gain from a listener? Ob-
viously, something should be changed. This may be the alteration of the exter-
nal world - by which we would return to the imperative sentence type, with the 
negative form “eventuality e must not hold” (8a’). Or it may be the alteration 
of the listener’s mind, the straightforward mode of which is to enrich the lis-
tener’s information state with the fact that e is true.
The prerequisite for this latter action is as follows: uB≠+5, since something 
must be changed. Or more precisely, what the speaker is responsible for is that 
they more or less think so, indeed: iBuB∈’’+5•’’’0”. If the speaker thinks that 
the listener is also aware of the truth of e, an adequate discourse marker should 
indicate this in order to create the appropriate addresser’s profile (8b). A good 
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reason for doing so is to initiate negotiation of common knowledge in order 
to, say, base a proposal on it in the continuation of the conversation, as illus-
trated in (8b-b’).
(8) a. Ili vegán.
 Ili vegan
 ‘Ili is vegan.’
 a’. Ili shouldn’t go vegan. Vegan diets do not provide vitamin K2.
 b. Szóval Ili vegán. / Ili tehát vegán.
 word-ins Ili vegan / Ili thus vegan
 ‘Ili can thus to be conlcuded to be vegan.’ / ‘Ergo Ili is vegan.’
 b’. So we should treat her in the Green Elephant vegan restaurant.
As can be seen in Table 1, there is a subtle difference in numerical characteriza-
tion between intention and desire/interest. The interest in information trans-
mission pertains to finding out the truth concerning e. The relevant value of 
β=iBrDuB+ is thus the set Θ={–5,+5} of the two truth values (referred to as ±5 
in the table); the addressee’s authority also pertains to the “possession of ” this 
knowledge: iBuAuB+∈±5 (“no secret to them”). What the addresser can in-
tend to carry out, however, is to transmit his or her knowledge with iB=+5 as 
the value iIuI+uB+; the question of addresser’s authority pertains to this val-
ue: iAiIuI+uB+=+5. The two authority values are independent of each other, 
which can be exemplified as follows. A doctor’s patient is entitled to the infor-
mation concerning the illness: iBuAuB+=+5. If, however, the doctor happens 
to speak to the patient on the phone, they are not in a position to discuss cer-
tain details: iAiIuI+uB+=0. Also, Table 1 provides the following complement 
to this latter criterion: the speaker’s authority ideally rests upon their bodily 
experience based on sense organs (iE=+5).
3.4. Interrogative profile
By using worldlet labels to characterize the declarative and the imperative pro-
file, as given in Table 1, we are in a position to provide a compositional imple-
mentation of Searle’s (1979: 69) idea: The basic interrogative type is nothing 
else but asking the addressee, by an imperative profile, to enrich their, the ad-
dresser’s, information state with the truth value of an eventuality e by means of 
a declarative profile. All the formal details underlying the worldlet labels pro-
vided in Table 1 cannot be discussed, but we are going to overview the crucial 
points.
Remember that the point of departure for having recourse to the imperative 
profile is a shared “negative state”, which can be specified in the given case as 
follows: iB∉±5 and iBuBiB∉±5. That is, it is considered that both interlocutors 
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are aware of the addresser’s “unknown status”: ...iB∈”0” (9a). The latter formu-
la expresses that the addresser has no bias towards the would-be answer; oth-
erwise, the adequate formula is as follows: ...iB∈’+4 (9b).
(10) a. Ili vegán? 
 Ili  vegan?
 ‘Is Ili vegan?’
 b. Ili ugye vegán? 
 Ili isn’t.she vegan?
 ‘Ili is vegan, isn’t she?’
Some kind of desire or interest and the explicit intention of the addresser per-
tain to the appropriate modification of the “negative status”: iBrDiB+∈±5, 
iIuI+iB+∈±5, the addresser’s output information state should already contain 
the truth value of e. The same motive of iB+∈±5 appears in the composition-
ally calculated authority formulas as well: iAiIuI+iB+∈±5, “I am sure that I am 
in a position to ask this question,” and iBuAiB+∈±5. As for the latter formula, 
the crucial factor of the addressee’s required authority is that they are in pos-
session of the given piece of information: iBuB∈±5.4. Szerint-expressions in the three major sentence types
This section is devoted to the characterization of the family of szerint-expres-
sions. In Table 1 in section 3.1, an interesting asymmetry can be observed be-
tween the dimensions of beliefs and desires. In the B-dimension, only beliefs 
of the addresser and the addressee are considered relevant, i.e., values of iB and 
iBuB. In the D-dimension, a third party’s desire is also to be considered: a sum 
formula was based upon values of iD, iBuD and iBoD. The importance of sze-
rint-expressions lies with elimination of this asymmetry, by making it possible 
to involve a third participant’s (an Experiencer’s) opinion in the discourse: the 
speech act may rest upon a simultaneous consideration of iB, iBuB and iBoB, 
see Tables 3–4. First of all, however, consider Table 2, in which the 18 szerint-
variants (3 persons ⋅ 3 sentence types ⋅ 2 attitudes) presented in (4a–c) in Sec-
tion 1, completed with the corresponding quotative variants and two discourse 
markers, szóval ‘so (what can be concluded)’ and viszont ‘however’, are classi-
fied according to a generalization of basically Langackerian inferential paths.8
8 “Language is a basic means of achieving epistemic control and intersubjective alignment. 
I view evidentiality as one dimension of epistemic assessment, which is best treated in a unified 
account of embodied experience and the striving for epistemic control. […] The speaker – by 
following an inferential path – projects its realization with greater or lesser confidence” (Lan-
gacker 2017:15–21).
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Table 2. The influence chain of szerint on the basis of the evidence of the recipient (sentences 
(4a)–(4c))
It is indicated in each cell how information travels from a piece of evidence to 
the interlocutor, who is assumed to require it in the given speech act. The inter-
locutor in question is the addressee in the case of declarations (...→2) and de-
mands (...→2→…), and the addresser in the case of questions (...→1). In the case 
of evaluation, each person can serve as the source of evidence (X→..., where 
X = 1, 2, or 3). Otherwise, the evidence is in the outer world, referred to by 0; 
and e  stands for the proposition the sentence with the given szerint-expres-
sion expresses, which does not coincide with the outer piece of experience in 
the evidential–inferential scenario. Three examples will serve as an illustration.
Chain e→0→2→1→2 means this: “I am conveying the information that Ili was 
there (e), witnessed by the fact that, say, you saw her coat hanging in the hall 
(...0→2...) and told me about it, and I am now reporting it back to you as a sum-
mary (...1→2...).” As this reporting back to someone (...2→1→2...) is strange, the 
corresponding type of sentence is higly marked (4b), but it can be repaired with 
the aid of the discourse markers presented in (8b), as shown in Table 2.
Let us now consider a short chain: 2→1. The outer world is irrelevant, “you 
yourself are the source of evidence (2→…), what counts is your evaluation; and 
the information should reach me (…→1),” since a question is considered.
Finally, let us discuss chain 0→1→2. “The outer world has sent me a message 
(0→1→…), that is, I could experience something, which I am now telling you 
(…→1→2).” Table 1 shows that in the given case the insertion of the correspond-
ing szerint-expression (szerintem ‘according to me’) is excluded, since it would 
(incorrectly) indicate indirect evidence (e→0→1→2). Unmarkedness serves as 
an indication of the fact that the evidence comes indirectly from the addresser.
Evidence →
Experiencer
↓    (person 6)
δ
evaluation/definition
X→…
Experienced
quotation
0→… / …→0
Indirect
inference/advice
E→0→… / …→0→E’
1
…→1→2. Szerintem/∅Ili szép.1→2 ∅Ili ott volt.0→1→2 Szerintem Ili ott volt.e→0→1→2
1→2→…! Szerintem/∅ házasodjanakössze!1→2→0
∅ Házasodjanak
össze!1→2→0
Szerintem/∅ házasodjanak
össze!1→2→0→e’
…→2→1? – 1→2→1 – 0→1→2→1 – e→0→1→2→1
2
…→1→2. Szóval szerintedIli szép.2→1→2
Szóval szerinted viszont
Ili ott volt.0→2→1→2
Szóval szerinted
Ili ott volt.e→0→2→1→2
1→2→…! Szóval szerinted házasod-janak össze!2→1→2→0
– 2→1→2→0
Szóval szerinted házasod- 
janak össze!2→1→2→0→e’
…→2→1? Szerinted/∅Ili szép?2→1 ∅Ili ott volt?0→2→1 Szerinted Ili ott volt?e→0→2→1
3
…→1→2. Szerinte Ili szép.3→1→2
Szerinte viszont
Ili ott volt.0→3→1→2
Szerinte Ili ott volt.e→0→3→1→2
1→2→…! Szerinte házasodjanakössze!3→1→2→0
Szerinte viszont házasod-
janak össze!3→1→2→0
Szerinte házasodjanak 
össze!3→1→2→0→e’
…→2→1? Szerinte Ili szép?3→2→1
Szóval szerinte viszont
Ili ott volt?0→3→2→1
Szerinte Ili ott volt?e→0→3→2→1
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Table 3. Well-formed quotative and probabilistic szerint-types in the three major sentence types 
(see (4))
Tables 3 and 4 present the entire contribution of szerint-expressions relative to the 
matrix intensional profiles given in Table 2, that is, the increment. The reader is en-
couraged to puzzle out the details; here only the crucial data are commented on.
B-dimension.  Experiencer δ, whose potential coincidence with “me” or “you” 
is treated as a special case, is always considered to have more reliable knowledge 
on the given e than others: iBδB=+5 in quotation and evaluation, and ≥iB and 
iBuB in inference. This factor ensures the usefulness of the utterance in an essen-
tially Gricean sense, besides the low values of iBuBδB, which ensures that “your 
output information state will contain more precise information”. iBδB=+5 if the 
experiencer is quoted as the immediate source of some outer evidence (Table 
3) or responsible for their own judgment (Table 4). The judgmentive character 
(see Table 4) is captured in ReALIS as follows: iBδB=+5 (e.g. “Ili is cute”) and 
iBrB=–5 (“Ili is ugly”) are parallelly assumed, which is not the case if e is a state 
of affairs whose truth can unambiguously be determined in the world.
D-dimension, I-dimension, A-dimension. The common label component in 
quotation, inference and evaluation is iIuI+: “I intend you to get prepared for 
some change (you should want that), which is considered to be in the inter-
est (D) of a group R or R’ whose identity the addressee should figure out in 
successful communication and “authorized” for you and me (A).” The change 
pertains to “your output knowledge” (uB+) in declaration, and “mine” (iB+) 
in question, and is indirect modulo e (obtaining whose precise truth value is 
the ultimate target) but direct modulo worldlets xB+δB+ (the experiencer’s 
Declarative Imperative Yes/no question
Quotative szerint–δ Probablistic szerint–δ
δ=o: iBδB=+5+5γ
iB∈“0’’
δ=o: iBδB=+5•’+4γ
iB ≤  γ
δ=o: iB=−5γ
iBδB∈+5•−5γ
iB∈“0’’γ
δ=1: δB∈’+4γ δ=1: δB=−5γ iB∈“0’’γ
δ=o: iE=0
iE’=+5
iBδE∈’+5•’+5
δ=o: iE=0
iE’’=+5
iBδE=’+5•0
iBδE’=’+5•+5
δ=o: iE=0
iBδE∈’+5•0
iBuBδE’∈’+5•’+5•+5
δ=i: iE=0
iE’=+5
δ=u: iE=0
iBδE∈’+5•0 iBδE’∈’+5•+5
iBuB∈“0’’
iBuBδB∈“‘0’’•+5γ
iBuB ≤ γ
iBuBδB∈“‘0’’•γ iBuB∈’’+5•γ iBuBiB∈’’+5•
(’)+5•“0’’
W=uB+ Default: e’≠rese W=iB+
(R) iBrDuB+=±5β or
(R’) iBrDuB+δB+=γ For e’: iBuD (R={u})
(R) iBrDiB+=±5β or
(R’) iBrDiB+δB+=+5γ
iBuAuB+δB+=γ For e or rese : iBuA iBuAiB+δB+=γ; Crucial:
ABS(γ) ≤ ABS(iBuBδBβ)
iIuI+uB+δB+=γ For e: iIuI+∈’’+5•’+4 iIuI+iB+δB=β
iAiIuI+uB+δB+=γ For e: iAiIuI+∈’’+5•’+5 iAiIuI+iB+δB=β
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information concerning e). The imperative case is special if the (otherwise) 
probabistic szerint-expression is used. Instead of iIuI+=+5 (“I want you to ac-
cept my instruction”; see Table 1), iIuI+∈’+4: “I can tolerate it if you do not 
entirely commit yourself to my instruction, which is factually an advice” (Ta-
ble 3). The imperative is also special in the evaluative mode (Table 4): here the 
instruction is strong but the addresser should be aware of the fact that others 
may give an opposite instruction.9
E-dimension. It is primarily the value of iBδE (”+4’/0/undefined) that 
distinguishes the three types of pragmasemantic contribution of szerint-
expressions. In the quotative, inferential, and evaluative cases, respectively, 
the given state of affairs is preferably directly experienced in the outer world 
by δ / not experienced / undefined. Symbols E’ and E” in Tables 3–4 refer to 
experiencing attitudes about eventualities e’ and e”, which are related to e in 
the interlocutors’s mental networks indirectly / “more indirectly”, in a way 
illustrated in Table 2.  “Me knowing about the experiencer’s indirect evi-
dence (iBδE’=+5)”, for instance, is to be regarded as an even more indirect 
evidence “to me” (iE” =+5), see Table 3. In Table 4, the indirect evidence be-
hind subjective evaluation (iBδE’=+5) is to be interpreted, say, in the case 
of Ili’s cuteness as follows: “my judgment rests upon a conglomerate e’ of her 
experienceable properties”.
The last comment, together with a  few earlier ones, suggests a  seem- 
ingly attractive generalization on the interpretation of szerint-expressions 
in given contexts: according to the corresponding predicate being subjec-
tive or objective, the evaluative or the inferential interpretation is triggered, 
respectively, with a quotative interpretation also emerging in the latter case, 
although requiring special discourse markers (see the middle column in Ta-
ble 2). The real picture is somewhat more complex. On the one hand, there 
are “essentially objective” predicates, which can, however, also be used “sub-
jectively” – while interlocutors are contending over their definitions. The 
sentence in (1a), for instance, can be interpreted as follows: “what I  can 
observe (iBδE’=+5: say, Ili no longer sleeps where she used to but her fur-
niture is still there) is enough for me to say that Ili has moved back home,” 
while another person may insist on saying that Ili will only have moved 
back home if all her furniture is back there. On the other hand, “essential-
ly subjective” predicates can also be used “objectively”: if, for example, the 
speaker – instead of their own opinion – provides us with a  summary of 
others’ (potential) opinions.
9 In Tables 2, 3 and 4 it can be observed that in ReALIS, imperative is treated as an inverted 
information flow: “I want you to carry e, which can metaphorically be regarded as informing the 
oracle of the outer world that e is now true.” Otherwise, the default starting-point of the informa-
tion flow is the outer world.
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Table 4. Evaluative szerint-types in the three major sentence types (see (4))
5. Conclusion
Szerint-expressions associated with human participants are multifaceted: in ad-
dition to a probabilistic/evidential–inferential and a quotative meaning, they can 
also express some kind of judgment in declarative sentences and in questions. 
Imperative sentences can serve as a source for further uses of szerint -expressions: 
they can be interpreted both as advice and as an expression of the speaker’s firm 
stance typically based on moral concerns. We accounted for the complex distri-
bution of the various uses in respect of person, attitude and sentence type in the 
representationalist dynamic discourse- and mind -representation theory ReALIS. 
The analysis shed light on how the expressions under investigation make language 
a basic means of achieving epistemic control and intersubjective alignment.10
Finally, let us conclude the paper by pinpointing what sets our approach 
apart from others that also strive for the description of “epistemic control 
and intersubjective alignment” (and interlocutors’ intentions, relative cre-
dence levels, and source-for-commitments roles): that is, purely cognitive ap- 
proaches (e.g. Fauconnier 1994) and common-ground based (Stalnaker 2002) 
formal approaches (e.g. Gunlogson 2008; Farkas and Roelofsen 2017).
As discourse situations are modeled in ReALIS in a  way that interlocu-
tors are represented as each-other-building lifelong discourse representation 
10 Szerint-expressions can also be associated with non-human participants in Hungarian, 
see (3a). This paper did not discuss this type – which, as we hypothesize, does not constitute 
a uniform further type beyond those taken into consideration in Section 4, but which can be 
traced back to them by finding the human minds behind the given szerint-expressions contain-
ing reference to objects or abstract concepts. 
Declarative (γ=+5) Yes/no question (γ=Θ, μ=’’+5) Imperative (γ=−5)
δ=o i o u o i
iBoB=α•γ, α,γ=+5 iB= γ
iBδB∈’’0’’•γ, γ∈Θ=±5
iB= γ∈−5
iB= γ∈−5
R’’iBrB∈−5 iBoB=+5•γ
iE undefined
iBoE’=+5•+5 iE’=+5 iBδE’=+5•+5
iBuBδB∈α*•γ (α*=‘“0’’) iBuBiBδB∈’’+5•+5•’’0’’•γ iBuB= γ∈−5
R’iBrDuB+δB+=γ R’iBrDiB+δB+=γ R={u}iD Typically: e’≠ rese
iBuAuB+δB+=γ
iBuAiB+δB+=γ iBuA∈+5•+5 
(e vagy rese)iBuBoB∈μ•μ•Θ iBuB∈+5•Θ
iIuI+uB+δB+=γ iIuI+iB+δB+=γ
iIuI+∈’+5•+5 (e; γ’’=iIuI+)
R’’iBrIuI+∈+5•’’’0’’•+5
iAiIuI+uB+δB+=γ iAiIuI+iB+δB+=γ iAiIuI+=γ’’ (e)
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structures by the mathematical technique of simultaneous recursion (Alberti 
2000), Maier’s (2016: 476) words on the scientific status of “cognitive DRT” pre-
cisely hold true for ReALIS: “What is often glossed over in such linguistic ap-
plications – even in many analyses of attitude ascriptions … – is Kamp’s (1981) 
original motivation of reconciling Fregean formal semantics (as championed 
at the time by Montague … [Dowty et al. 1981]) with a traditional, Lockean 
cognitive theory of communication in terms of speakers’ and hearers’ mental 
states. To this end, Kamp in his original presentations actually describes DRSs 
as representations of the mental state of the hearer, rather than of the more ab-
stract notion of a Stalnakerian [e.g. Stalnaker 2002] common ground.11 What 
sets this cognitive conception of DRT apart from purely cognitive theories like 
Fauconnier’s (1994) Mental Spaces, is that the DRS language has a precise syn-
tax and model-theoretic interpretation. Hence, in addition to its cognitive inter- 
pretation, a DRS also represents the actual truth conditions of a sentence or 
discourse. Linguists have since stripped DRT of its cognitive interpretation. 
But Kamp and a few others have kept it alive, even extending DRT to a full-
blown representational theory of attitudes…”References
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